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Abstract 
In this paper we examine the role of out-group signals and in-group leader tactics in the 
choice and evaluation of rival in-group leader candidates. Study 1 found preference for a 
negotiating in-group leader over an oppositional leader, mediated by perceived leader 
effectiveness and prototypicality. In Study 2 participants chose a leader who had received 
out-group endorsement and in Studies 3 and 4, participants chose a negotiating in-group 
leader where the out-group was prepared to negotiate and an oppositional leader where the 
out-group was not prepared to negotiate. In the latter three studies, there was evidence for 
participants being strategic in their choices: effects were mediated by effectiveness but not 
prototypicality. These findings suggest our understanding of collective action will be 
enriched through attention to the situational cues provided by out-groups, and to the context 
of competing voices of collective action leadership.  
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Leader choice: out-group signals and collective action tactics 
Janus-like, the leader stands in one place, facing two different ways. In one direction he is 
the head of the movement – the embodiment of commitment to its values and program []. In 
the other direction he functions as a negotiator and communicator between the external 
environment and the internal one. In one function, that of mobilization, he breathes the fire 
and brimstone of enthusiastic mission. In the other function, that of articulation, he pours the 
oil of bargaining, compromise, and the common culture (Gusfield, 1966, p.141). 
 
Leaders operate in complex environments; their success depends on being able to read 
the external and internal environment, pick the right strategies, and garner the support of 
followers. Gusfield (1966) notes the inherent tension this complexity creates for leaders who 
are at times required to mobilize their members in opposition to out-groups, and at others, to 
negotiate with out-groups on behalf of their members. Despite the intuitiveness of this point, 
social psychological interest in social movements focuses on explaining how people are 
mobilized to collective action, to the neglect of explaining how support is secured for the 
advancement of group interests through negotiation (cf. Gleibs & Haslam, 2016; 
Klandermans, 2014; Thomas & Louis, 2014; Thomas, McGarty, & Louis, 2014). Moreover, 
although researchers note the importance of in-group leaders to providing collective action 
frames as part of the mobilization process (Benford & Snow, 2000; Steffens, Schuh, Haslam, 
Pérez, & van Dick, 2015), the potential for out-group signals to influence how followers 
evaluate leaders and their different proposals for action is likewise overlooked in the 
research.  
In this paper we take the kind of context that is typically of interest to collective 
action researchers – one where a powerful out-group threatens the interests of an in-group -- 
and consider how the tactics advocated by rival in-group leader candidates (opposition vs 
negotiation), and out-group signaling of willingness to negotiate, are consequential for leader 
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evaluation and choice. Our aims are simple. First, we hope to demonstrate the importance of 
considering how out-group signals of intent towards an in-group are consequential for in-
group leader-follower relationships: a point on which there is supportive theory, but little 
social psychological data (Haslam, Reicher, & Platow, 2011). Second, our broader aim is to 
encourage cross-fertilization between the collective action, intergroup negotiation, and 
leadership research domains (see also Becker & Tausch, 2015; Gleibs & Haslam, 2016; Louis 
et al., 2016; Steffens et al., 2015; Stekelenburg, 2013).   
 
Intergroup competition and choosing between oppositional and conciliatory leaders 
Research informed by the social identity perspective (Tajfel, 1982; Turner, Hogg, 
Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987) finds that contexts perceived in terms of group-based 
competition (or conflict) render people more likely to accentuate intergroup differences 
(Jetten, Spears, & Postmes, 2004), attend more to in-group sources of influence (Blackwood, 
Terry, & Duck, 2015), and display increased in-group cohesion and out-group hostility 
(Wright & Tropp, 2002). Such effects favour leaders whose objective is to mobilize support 
for confrontation with the out-group. For instance, there is evidence that in contexts of 
intergroup competition, group members will rally behind leaders who favour the in-group and 
distance their group from the out-group (Hogg, van Knippenberg, & Rast, 2012); and they 
will downgrade in-group leaders who cooperate with out-groups whilst upgrading those who 
behave antagonistically (Lundgren, 1998). This would appear to present a problem for leaders 
who, instead of calling for collective action, urge restraint and support for more conciliatory 
approaches such as negotiation.  
Social psychological interest in negotiation as an intergroup phenomenon has 
emerged only recently. What clearly distinguishes negotiation from archetypal forms of 
collective action (e.g., mass protest) is that there are limited opportunities for group members 
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to be actively involved, and the focus of this research has typically been on those who 
prosecute negotiation on behalf of their groups (i.e., leaders and group representatives rather 
than followers; De Dreu, Aaldering, & Saygi, 2015).  Thus, to the best of our knowledge, the 
important question of when group members will support leaders advocating negotiation and 
how they evaluate conciliatory versus oppositional forms of leadership has not been directly 
investigated. There is, however, evidence to suggest that for negotiators, simply the 
knowledge that they are negotiating on behalf of their group rather than themselves, may 
engender more hostile behaviours (Wildschut, Pinter, Vevea, Insko, & Schopler, 2003); and 
that the mere salience of group identity can render group representatives tasked with 
negotiation more competitive (Trötschel, Hüffmeier, & Loschelder, 2010). Moreover, the 
findings that these hostile behaviours occur more where negotiators have concerns about in-
group status (Van Kleef, Steinel, van Knippenberg, Hogg, & Svensson, 2007) or 
accountability to the in-group (Mosterd & Rutte, 2000; Van Kleef et al., 2007), suggests that 
they may themselves perceive that this is what is required to secure the support of their 
group. Although negotiators and leaders are not always one and the same, as Pittinsky and 
Simon (2007) note, “history is replete with leaders who have exploited, or in some cases 
created, intergroup hostilities in order to secure their positions” (p.588).  
This brief overview of the evidence presents a gloomy outlook for conciliatory over 
more oppositional forms of leadership; we would expect that given the choice between a 
leader advocating an oppositional tactic and one advocating negotiation, group members 
would tend to throw their support behind the former. Yet, when we turn to the wider literature 
on intergroup competition and conflict we find that oftentimes groups employ multiple 
tactics, sometimes in tandem and sometimes consecutively (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011); 
and that groups may be divided over whether more hawkish or dovish tactics are warranted 
(Aaldering & De Dreu, 2012; Steinel, De Dreu, Ouwehand, & Ramírez-Marín, 2009). 
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Moreover, collective action research highlights the role of people’s legitimacy and stability 
beliefs in moderating support for more or less radical tactics. Indeed, there is some evidence 
that points to normative expectations—at least in liberal democracies--of cooperation and 
conciliation and suggests that more oppositional strategies will receive support only when 
more moderate strategies are seen to be ineffective (Schwartzmantel, 2010; Tausch et al., 
2011; Wright & Lubensky, 2009).  
 
The mediating role of leader prototypicality and efficacy 
In accounting for the in-group biases associated with support for more oppositional 
forms of leadership, the social identity theory of leadership (Hogg, 2001), focuses particular 
attention on the degree to which follower appraisals of in-group leaders reflect concerns 
about whether the leader is seen as a prototypical group member (i.e., one of us). According 
to the meta-contrast principle (Oakes, Haslam, & Turner, 1998), who within a group is 
viewed as prototypical varies as a function of contextually salient inter-group and intra-group 
comparisons. Thus, in a context of intergroup competition, the prototypical position polarizes 
away from the out-group and so favours more oppositional leadership. A clear implication is 
that where groups are at loggerheads, any sign of closeness between an in-group leader and 
an out-group could compromise their representativeness and so their support (Platow & van 
Knippenberg, 2001).  
There is now a substantial body of evidence to support the role of prototypicality in 
people’s appraisals of their leaders (see van Knippenberg, van Knippenber, Cremer, & Hogg, 
2004 for an overview). However, in recent years, researchers working from a social identity 
perspective have shown a renewed interest in explaining people’s instrumental (as well as 
identity) motives in both the collective action (e.g., van Zomeren & Klandermans, 2011) and 
leadership domains (e.g, Haslam et al., 2011). Specifically, it is argued that in addition to 
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wanting to express identity and select leaders who embody who we are, followers also care 
about achieving group goals and whether a leader will be effective in doing so (i.e., 
delivering for us).  
From this perspective, research on leader effectiveness frequently treats effectiveness 
as an outcome of prototypicality (e.g., Cicero, Pierro, & van Knippenberg, 2009; van 
Knippenberg, 2011) and there are both theoretical and empirical grounds for arguing that they 
are interdependent (Steffens, Haslam, Ryan, & Kessler, 2013). However, it has been shown 
that there are instances where concerns about the effectiveness of leaders may be considered 
independently and may even override considerations of how prototypical or representative 
leaders are (Haslam et al., 2011; Morton, Postmes, & Jetten, 2007). For example, Teixeira, 
Demoulin, and Yzerbyt (2011, 2013) have shown preference for pro-out-group deviants (i.e., 
representatives who deviate from the in-group prototype in the direction of the out-group) 
when the goal of negotiation is short-term, and there is an expectation of some success. Thus, 
we might expect that an out-group’s positive overtures towards an in-group leader might 
render them more acceptable (not less) by virtue of their greater potential effectiveness in 
negotiating a deal.  
The notion that group members are often strategic in how they respond to intergroup 
competition or conflict is well established. For instance, there is a wealth of research 
informed by interdependence theory and behavioural economics that attests to the role of 
cost-benefit appraisals in people’s calculations (De Dreu et al., 2015; Demoulin & De Dreu, 
2010). There is also a large body of research using the prisoner’s dilemma paradigm that 
highlights the importance of people’s expectations of other players’ actions in their 
calculations. Certainly, it has been shown that at the individual-level, partners who defect 
elicit less cooperation; whereas when cooperation is expected, cooperative behaviour is more 
likely (Rapoport & Guyer, 1966). Moreover, the first mover in setting the agenda establishes 
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this principle; if the first mover signals cooperation, the subsequent negotiation is, at least 
initially, likely to be guided by this frame (Clark & Sefton, 2001; Dufwenberg & 
Kirchsteiger, 2004).  
At the group level, there is also evidence that members of low status groups are 
sensitive to the responsiveness (Wright, 2001) or repressiveness of powerful out-groups 
(Drury & Reicher, 2005) and will sometimes calibrate their responses in accordance with 
how they expect out-groups to respond (e.g., Scheepers, Spears, Doosje, & Manstead, 2006; 
Louis, Taylor, & Douglas, 2005). Of note, there is research on the role of out-groups in 
bolstering responses to minority influence (David & Turner, 1999); and suggestions that the 
illegitimate actions of out-groups may undermine moderate voices of leadership (Blackwood, 
Hopkins, & Reicher, 2012, 2013, 2015). Finally, there is evidence that out-groups are 
themselves aware of this. Out-groups have been shown to strategically bolster support for 
conciliatory leaders through tactics such as helping the other leader to meet their internal 
challenges (Sebenius, 2013); expressions of empathy (Nadler & Liviatan, 2006); and 
conciliatory actions (Tomlinson & Lewicki, 2006).  
 
In sum, there are theoretical and empirical grounds for arguing that both identity and 
instrumental motives may be implicated in support for group leaders in intergroup contexts of 
competition or conflict. There are also grounds for arguing that through their actions, out-
groups can shape group members’ understandings of the intergroup relationship and their 
support for rival forms of leadership. Positive out-group signals, in the context of intergroup 
conflict, have the potential to undermine the prototypicality of an in-group leader. However, 
they also have the potential to shift perceptions of the intergroup context and so the 
prototypical position of the group, as well as to enhance perceptions of leader effectiveness.  
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Present research 
The present studies aim to examine a gap in the social psychological literatures on 
collective action, negotiation, and leadership. Across the four studies we examine choice of 
one of two in-group leader candidates in a context where a powerful (high status) out-group 
has announced a decision that will harm their group. Study 1 examines choice between an in-
group leader candidate who advocates either a negotiation tactic or an opposition tactic and 
an in-group leader candidate for whom no information is given. Study 2 examines choice 
between an in-group leader candidate with whom the out-group has signaled preference to 
negotiate or not-negotiate, and an in-group leader candidate for whom no information is 
given. Study 3 examines choice between two in-group leader candidates where one advocates 
a negotiation tactic and the other advocates an opposition tactic; and where the out-group has 
signaled either willingness to negotiate or refusal to negotiate. Study 4 replicates Study 3 
with a sample recruited on the basis of interest or involvement in activist groups.  
In Study 1 we begin from the premise that in a context of out-group threat, support for 
an oppositional leader candidate or a negotiating leader candidate is not a given. Rather, it 
will depend on whether the leader is seen as effective for the group (i.e., delivering for us: 
H1a) and as prototypical of the group (i.e., one of us: H1b). In Studies 2, 3 and 4 we further 
propose that an out-group’s signaling of (un)willingness to negotiate will influence people’s 
choice of leader. Specifically, in Study 2, an out-group signaling preference for a particular 
leader will strengthen support for that leader (H2). In Studies 3 and 4, an out-group signaling 
willingness to negotiate will strengthen support for a negotiating in-group leader over an 
oppositional in-group leader (H3). The mediating effects of perceptions of leader 
effectiveness and leader prototypicality are again investigated.  
 
STUDY 1 
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In Study1, our interest was in the role of effectiveness and prototypicality in how 
people choose when presented with a leader who proposes an oppositional tactic or one who 
proposes a negotiation tactic, in the context of threat from a powerful out-group. In terms of 
who should receive most support, the literature is not clear and so we make no prediction. On 
the one hand, intergroup threat produces the conditions for accentuating intergroup 
differences (Jetten et al., 2004; Wright & Tropp, 2002), and increasing support for leaders 
who distance themselves from the out-group (Hogg & van Knippenberg, 2003). Conversely, 
there is a wider literature that points to normative expectations—at least in liberal 
democracies--of cooperation and conciliation and suggests that more oppositional strategies 
will receive support only when more moderate strategies have failed (e.g., Tausch et al., 
2011). According to both lines of argument, the choice of leader (oppositional or negotiating) 
will be mediated by believing the leader to be effective in advancing the group’s goals (H1a) 
as well as being prototypical or representative of the group (H1b).  
 
Method 
Participants and design.  Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) was used to recruit 
116 adults to participate in an on-line survey on leadership. Seventeen participants who failed 
the manipulation check were excluded leaving 99 participants (female = 44; male = 56) aged 
18 to 70 (M=34; SD=11.77). All participants resided in the US and although they ranged 
across the full left-right political spectrum most placed themselves on the centre-left 
(Mdn=41 on a 100 point scale).   
We employed a one-way design comparing the effect of the independent variable (in-
group leader tactic) at three levels (negotiate; organize opposition; control) on the dependent 
variable, choice of leader. Leader effectiveness and prototypicality were investigated as 
potential mediators.  
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Materials and procedure. A questionnaire on leadership was completed on-line. All 
participants were first asked to think about a hypothetical situation in which they are a 
member of a group and another group is considering a decision that would harm their group’s 
interests. In order to manipulate in-group leader tactic, participants were then told that there 
were two potential leaders for their group: Leader X and Leader Y, and were then randomly 
assigned to one of three conditions where they were told: “Leader Y thinks the best strategy 
is to negotiate with the out-group” (negotiate condition); “Leader Y thinks the best strategy is 
to organize opposition to the out-group” (organize opposition condition); or they were given 
no additional information for Leader Y (control condition). All conditions were randomized 
and throughout the questionnaire, so too was the order of presenting Leaders X (about whom 
no information was ever given) and Leader Y (see Appendix A for scenarios and 
manipulations).  
Manipulation check. A two-item manipulation check was also included at the 
conclusion of the study. Participants were asked “Which leader has the strategy of 
negotiation?” and “Which leader has the strategy of organizing opposition?” and were given 
the option of answering Leader X, Leader Y, or Neither / don’t know.   
Choose leader Y was measured using a single dichotomous item: “If forced to choose, 
which leader would you choose (Leader X [coded -1] or Leader Y [coded +1])?” 
Leader effectiveness was measured using four items.  Two items tapped overall 
effectiveness, “Which leader do you think would be better for your group?” and “Which 
leader would be the least effective leader?” (reverse scored); and two items assessed 
effectiveness in influencing the out-group, “Which leader do you think would be most likely 
to influence the other group’s decision?” and “Which leader would be less influential with the 
other group?” (reverse scored). Items were measured on a 1 (Leader X) to 7 (Leader Y) scale 
and were averaged to form the scale (α=.86).    
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Leader prototypicality was measured using four items based on van Knippenberg and 
van Knippenberg’s (2005) research: “Which leader is less typical of members of your 
group?”(reverse scored); “Which leader is less likely to embody the values and beliefs of 
your group?” (reverse scored); “Which leader represents what is characteristic of your 
group?); and “Which leader is more representative of the values and beliefs of your group?” 
The four items were averaged, with higher scores indicating Leader Y was seen as more 
prototypical (α=.89). 
The two mediators, leader effectiveness and prototypicality, were strongly 
intercorrelated, r=.67. This is consistent with research showing that prototypical leaders tend 
to be regarded as more effective leaders and effective leaders tend to be seen as more 
prototypical (Steffens et al., 2013). However, given the strong theoretical grounds to 
differentiate between the two (van Knippenberg & van Knippenberg, 2005; van Knippenberg, 
2011), we retained these measures as distinct.  
 
Results 
A chi-square test of independence found that support for Leader Y differed across the 
three tactic conditions (negotiation: 92%; opposition: 44%; and control: 29%), 2(2, N=99) = 
12.38, p=.002). One-way ANOVAs on effectiveness and prototypicality in the three leader 
tactic conditions found the same pattern of results.  Specifically, the negotiating leader was 
more effective (M=4.93, SD=1.07) and prototypical (M=4.67, SD=1.28) than the oppositional 
leader (Ms=4.03. 3.86, SDs=1.52, 1.47) and the leader where no information was given 
(Ms=3.55, 3.49, SDs=1.59, 1.47; Fs=8.61, 6.38, ps<.001, .003 respectively). The overall 
means, standard deviations and inter-correlations are shown in Table 1. 
 
Insert Table 1 here 
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In order to examine the indirect effects of leader tactic (negotiate or organize 
opposition) on choice of Leader Y via effectiveness and prototypicality, mediation analyses 
were conducted using Hayes’ (2013) PROCESS computational model. Choice of Leader Y 
(+1, compared to Leader X, -1) was used as the criterion.  Two contrast codes were used as 
predictors: the focal variable of in-group leader tactic (a manipulated variable coded +1 = 
negotiation tactic, -1 = opposition tactic, and 0 = no information condition); and the 
orthogonal covariate of no information (a variable contrasting the two in-group tactic 
conditions, coded -1, with the control condition, coded +2). Perceived leader effectiveness 
and prototypicality were analyzed as simultaneous mediators of the effect of leader tactic on 
leader choice. Bootstrapping with 5000 samples and 95% confidence intervals was used to 
assess the significance of the indirect effects.  
As Figure 1 illustrates, the total effect of leader tactic on leader choice was 
significant. Participants showed stronger support for Leader Y in the condition where the 
leader’s tactic preference was to negotiate with the other group compared to where their 
preference was to organise opposition. This effect became non-significant when the 
mediators were included in the model.  
Insert Figure 1 here 
Analysis of effectiveness and prototypicality as parallel mediators revealed that both 
effectiveness and prototypicality were predicted by in-group leader tactic. In the condition 
where leader Y preferred to negotiate, leader Y was rated as more effective and prototypical. 
In addition, both effectiveness and prototypicality were associated with leader choice: the 
perception that Leader Y was more effective and prototypical than Leader X was associated 
with the choice of Leader Y over Leader X.  
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Finally, inspection of the bias corrected confidence intervals revealed significant 
indirect effects of tactic on leader choice via both effectiveness (IE = .64, SE = .40, 95% CI 
.14, 1.59), and prototypicality (IE = .75, SE = .57, 95% CI .03, 1.86).  
 
Discussion 
In Study 1, participants were placed in one of two conditions: one where they had the 
option of choosing between a leader with a negotiation tactic vs a leader for whom no 
information was given; and one where they had the option of choosing between a leader with 
an oppositional tactic vs a leader for whom, again, no information was given. We assumed 
that a leader with any strategy would be better than a leader with none, but made no 
prediction regarding this, nor regarding differential support across the two leader tactic 
conditions. Rather, our interest was in what would mediate preference across the two 
conditions. We found evidence for stronger support for the leader whose strategic response to 
a threatening out-group is negotiation; and this preference for an in-group negotiator rather 
than a more oppositional figure was via perceiving the negotiating leader as both effective 
and prototypical (H1a and H1b supported).  
Much intergroup research confirms that out-group threats can evoke more aggressive 
and discriminatory responding (Scheepers, Spears, Doosje, & Manstead, 2003; Stephan et al., 
2002; Trawalter, Richeson, & Shelton, 2009). But, consistent with our findings, research also 
shows normative support for intergroup cooperation and conciliation (Louis, 2014; Tausch et 
al., 2011) and that low-status groups may be loath to display in-group bias (Scheepers et al., 
2006). Of course, such responses would make strategic sense to the extent that there was an 
expectation of being able to influence the intergroup relationship (Tausch et al., 2011; Wright 
& Tropp, 2002) or to deliver a negotiated solution (Teixeira et al., 2011). An obvious factor 
in such appraisals would be the stance taken by the out-group.  
Leader choice: out-group signals and collective action tactics 
 
STUDY 2 
In Study 2 our interest turned to how, in the context of intergroup threat, an out-
group’s signaling preparedness to negotiate (or not negotiate) with one particular in-group 
leader affects support for that leader. We test the hypothesis that there should be stronger 
support for an in-group leader candidate with whom the out-group is happy to negotiate 
compared with a leader with whom the out-group is not prepared to negotiate or one for 
whom there is no information (H2). We make this prediction on the premise that an out-
group’s preference to negotiate with a particular candidate would be perceived as reflecting 
positively on that leader’s ability to deliver for the group (Haslam et al., 2011). In making 
this prediction, however, we note that there are potentially competing processes; an in-group 
leader who receives some form of endorsement by the out-group may be perceived as less 
prototypical of the group (Hogg & van Knippenberg, 2003) and accordingly receive less 
support. In the present study, we therefore explore a suppression model in which both leader 
effectiveness and prototypicality are expected to be positively associated with candidate 
endorsement (H2a), and in which we test the hypothesis that a threatening out-group’s 
signaling of support for one of two rival leadership candidates will heighten perceived 
effectiveness and lower prototypicality (H2b).  
 
Method 
Participants and design. We recruited 105 participants, again via MTurk. Following 
removal of cases where participants failed to complete the survey, our sample comprised 102 
adults (female: 48; male: 53) between the ages of 18 and 66 (M=32; SD = 11.03).  
We employed a one-way design comparing the effect of the independent variable 
(out-group preference) at three levels (out-group prefers to negotiate with Leader A; not 
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negotiate with Leader A; no information control) on the dependent variable, choice of Leader 
A (coded +1, vs B, coded -1). Leader effectiveness and prototypicality were investigated as 
potential mediators.  
Materials and procedure. A questionnaire on leadership was completed on-line. In 
order to manipulate out-group preference, participants were asked to think about a 
hypothetical situation in which they are a member of a group and where another group is 
considering a decision that would harm their group’s interests. They were told that there were 
two potential leaders for their group: Leader A and Leader B. Participants were then 
randomly assigned to one of three conditions where they were told: “The other group has 
indicated that it is happy to negotiate with Leader A from your group” (negotiate condition); 
“The other group has indicated that it would prefer not to negotiate with Leader A from your 
group” (not negotiate condition); or were provided no further information (control condition). 
See Appendix B for scenario and manipulations. 
Choose leader A was measured using a single dichotomous item: If forced to choose, 
which leader would you choose: Leader A (coded +1) or Leader B (coded -1). 
Leader effectiveness was measured using three items: two items from Study 1, reverse 
scored (“Which leader do you think would be worse for your group?” and “Which leader do 
you think would be least likely to influence the other group?”) and one item tapping in-group 
support (“Which leader will other group members be more willing to follow?”). Items were 
measured on a 1 (Leader A) to 7 (Leader B) scale and averaged to form the scale (α=.58).    
Leader prototypicality was measured using two items from Study 1: “Which leader is 
less typical of members of your group?” reverse scored; and “Which leader is more likely to 
embody the values and beliefs of your group?” The same 7-point scale was used as above and 
the items were averaged to form the scale (r=.66). 
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The inter-correlation between the two composite scales, was again high r=.60. We 
retained the two variables as distinct on theoretical grounds (van Knippenberg, 2011). 
 
Results 
A chi-square test of independence found that support for Leader A differed across the 
three out-group preference conditions (negotiate: 89%; not negotiate: 55%; and control: 
74%), 2(2, N=101) = 6.03, p=.003). A one-way ANOVA on effectiveness across the three 
conditions found that the leader who the out-group was happy to negotiate with was more 
effective (M=4.98, SD=1.20) than the leader who the out-group preferred not to negotiate 
with (M=4.11, SD=1.55) and the leader where no information was given (M=4.04, SD=1.20; 
F=5.75, ps<.004). A one-way ANOVA on prototypicality found little difference across the 
three conditions (Ms=4.50, 4.27, 4.33; SDs=1.57, 1.70, 1.33; F=0.18, p= .835). The overall 
means, standard deviations and inter-correlations are shown in Table 2. 
Insert Table 2 here 
In order to examine the indirect effects of out-group signaling of preference on choice 
of leader A via leader effectiveness and prototypicality, mediation analyses were conducted 
using Hayes’ (2013) PROCESS computational model. Choice of Leader A was used as the 
criterion, and two contrast codes were used as predictors: out-group preference (a 
manipulated variable coded +1 = out-group negotiate with Leader A, -1 = out-group not 
negotiate with Leader A, and zero = no information condition); and no information (a 
variable contrasting the two out-group preference conditions, coded -1, with the control 
condition, coded +2) entered as a covariate. Perceived leader effectiveness and 
prototypicality were analyzed as simultaneous mediators of the effect of out-group preference 
on leader choice. Bootstrapping with 5000 samples and 95% confidence intervals was used to 
assess the significance of the indirect effects.  
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As Figure 2 illustrates, the total effect of out-group preference on choose leader A 
was significant. Participants were more likely to choose leader A in the condition where the 
out-group preferred to negotiate with Leader A (87%) compared with the condition where the 
out-group preferred not to negotiate with Leader A (53%). This effect decreased substantially 
when the mediators were in the model (although remaining marginally significant). Both 
effectiveness and prototypicality were positively associated with leader choice: evaluation of 
Leader A as more effective and prototypical than Leader B, was associated with the choice of 
Leader A over Leader B.  
Analysis of leader effectiveness and prototypicality as parallel mediators revealed that 
in the condition where the out-group signalled its preference to negotiate with Leader A, 
Leader A was rated as more effective than Leader B; but that out-group preference had no 
effect on perceived prototypicality. Consistent with the results above, inspection of the bias 
corrected confidence intervals revealed significant indirect effects of out-group preference on 
leader choice via effectiveness (IE = .95, SE = 1.13, 95% CI .10, 3.66), but not via 
prototypicality (IE = .14, SE = .40, 95% CI -.69, .93; see Figure 2).  
 
Insert Figure 2 here 
 
Discussion 
Study 2 contributes a number of novel findings to the scholarly literature. First, 
differential out-group signaling of preference was shown to shape leadership support: 
participants were far more likely to choose Leader A when the other group was happy to 
negotiate with them than when not (H2 supported). Second, whilst both perceived 
effectiveness and prototypicality independently predicted support for a leadership candidate 
(H2a supported), only the former mediated the out-group preference effect (H2b partially 
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supported). That is to say, in the present data, out-group preference boosted perceived 
effectiveness but had no effect on prototypicality, and certainly did not undermine it.  
In light of the strong inter-correlation between the two proposed mediators, we do not 
wish to overstate the differential effects of leader effectiveness and prototypicality. What is 
more important, we suggest, is the demonstration that people are attentive to out-group cues 
in their evaluation and choice of a leader: minimal information suggesting that the out-group 
preferred to negotiate with leader A was sufficient for people to evaluate leader A as more 
effective than leader B and to choose leader A over leader B. This resonates with the research 
on intergroup reconciliation where it is argued that out-group leaders can and do influence in-
group support for conciliatory action (e.g., Bar Tal, 2000; Nadler & Leviatan, 2006).  
 
STUDY 3 
Our aim in Study 3 was to examine how the interplay between an out-group and in-
group leader’s tactical approach to dealing with an intergroup conflict affects leader choice. 
Specifically, we focus on the interaction between out-group willingness versus unwillingness 
to negotiate and rival in-group leaders with tactics of negotiation versus opposition. Whereas 
in Study 2, the out-group signal communicated preference for a particular candidate, here the 
out-group signal was of general openness to negotiation and so our theorizing was somewhat 
different.  According to theory, an out-group signaling (un)willingness to negotiate should be 
an important factor affecting stability and hence, where the prototypical position within a 
group lies: there should be greater polarization from an out-group that expresses 
intransigence, and less from a group which is more conciliatory (Oakes et al., 1998). Out-
group signaling should also be an important factor in determining the likely effectiveness of 
conciliatory versus oppositional tactics in influencing the outcome—whilst conciliation might 
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appear feasible where the out-group is open to negotiation, it is decidedly less so where the 
out-group is not. Thus, we make the following predictions:  
H3. An out-group leader signaling willingness to negotiate will strengthen support 
for an in-group leader candidate with a tactic of negotiation (compared with an out-group 
leader signaling un-willingness to negotiate.  
H3a. Moreover, the relationship between the manipulated variable (out-group 
willingness to negotiate) and the choice of a negotiating leader over an oppositional leader 
will be mediated by positive evaluations of the negotiating leader’s effectiveness and 
prototypicality.  
 
Method 
Participants and design.  We recruited 101 participants via Amazon’s Mechanical 
Turk. Eleven participants failed the manipulation checks and were excluded, leaving 90 
participants (female: 37; male: 53) who were aged 18 to 62 (M=35).  All participants resided 
in the US and although they ranged across the full left-right political spectrum, most placed 
themselves on the left (Mdn=33 on a 100 point scale).   
Study 3 employed a between groups design comparing the effect of the independent 
variable (out-group negotiate) at two levels (negotiate; not negotiate) on the dependent 
variable, choice of in-group leader. Leader effectiveness and prototypicality were again 
investigated as potential mediators in the relationship between out-group willingness to 
negotiate and choice of leader.  
Materials and procedure. Participants were asked to imagine they were a member of a 
group that was threatened by another group and that there were two potential leaders 
appealing for their support. All participants were told “Leader N’s strategy to stop the other 
group’s threatening decision is to negotiate with the other group” and “Leader O’s strategy to 
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stop the other group’s threatening decision is to organize opposition to the other group”.  
Participants were then told either “The leader of the other group has issued a statement saying 
they are prepared to negotiate” (out-group negotiate) or “The leader of the other group has 
issued a statement saying they are not prepared to negotiate” (out-group not negotiate).1 All 
conditions were randomized and so too was the order of presenting information about 
Leaders N and O (See Appendix C for scenario and manipulation).  
Comprehension and manipulation checks. In order to reinforce the information and 
ensure it was understood, two questions immediately followed the manipulation: “Which 
leader has the strategy of negotiation?” and “Is the other group prepared to negotiate?” If 
incorrect, participants were provided with the correct information and were asked to try 
again. A final manipulation check was provided at the conclusion of the survey: participants 
were presented with statements regarding Leader N and Leader O’s preferred strategies and 
were again asked whether the other group was prepared to negotiate. 
Choose Leader N: Participants were asked “If forced to choose, which leader would 
you choose to support (Leader O [coded -1]; Leader N [coded +1])?” The same items used in 
Study 1 were used to measure effectiveness (α=.88) and prototypicality (α=.79), with higher 
scores indicating that leader N was seen as more effective and prototypical. The inter-
correlation between the two composite scales was r=.48.  
 
Results 
A chi-square test of independence found that support for Leader N (negotiate) was 
significantly stronger in the condition where the out-group signaled willingness to negotiate 
(90%) compared to the un-willingness to negotiate condition (49%), 2(1, N=90) = 17.41, 
p<.001. One sample t-tests compared the overall means for relative effectiveness (M=4.47, 
SD=1.53) and prototypicality (M=4.54, SD=1.25) ratings of Leader N vs Leader O against the 
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mid-point of the scales. Consistent with Study 1, there was an overall perception that Leader 
N (negotiate) was more effective and prototypical than Leader O (opposition: ts=27.63, 
34.24, ps < .001). The overall means, standard deviations and inter-correlations are shown in 
Table 3.  
 
Insert Table 3 here 
 
In order to examine the indirect effects of out-group preparedness to negotiate on 
choice of leader N via effectiveness and prototypicality, mediation analyses were conducted 
using Hayes’ (2013) PROCESS computational model. Out-group negotiate (coded +1 = out-
group prepared to negotiate, or -1 = not prepared to negotiate) was entered as the predictor, 
and leader choice as the criterion. Perceived leader effectiveness and prototypicality were 
analyzed as simultaneous mediators of the effect of out-group negotiate on leader choice. 
Bootstrapping with 5000 samples and 95% confidence intervals was used to assess the 
significance of the indirect effects.  
As Figure 3 illustrates, the total effect of out-group preparedness to negotiate on 
choice of Leader N was significant. Most participants supported Leader N (negotiate) in the 
condition where the out-group was prepared to negotiate (90%); and most supported Leader 
O (opposition) where the out-group was not prepared to negotiate (51%). This effect 
remained significant but decreased when the mediators were included in the model.  
Insert Figure 3 here 
Specifically, analysis of effectiveness and prototypicality as parallel mediators 
revealed that the out-group’s preparedness to negotiate affected effectiveness but not 
prototypicality. When the out-group was prepared to negotiate, the negotiating leader 
candidate was rated as relatively more effective, but not more prototypical than when the out-
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group was not prepared to negotiate. Moreover, overall effectiveness but not prototypicality 
was associated with leader choice: only the perception that Leader N was relatively more 
effective than Leader O was associated with the choice of Leader N over Leader O.  
Consistent with the above, inspection of the bias corrected confidence intervals 
revealed significant indirect effects of out-group preference on leader choice via effectiveness 
(IE = .93, SE = .59, 95% CI .32, 2.06), but not prototypicality (IE = .01, SE = .10, 95% CI -
.12, .30).  
 
Discussion 
In Study 3, we found that out-group signalling shaped people’s choice of leader (H3 
supported) and that this was mediated by evaluations of leader effectiveness (H3a partially 
supported). Specifically, an out-group signalling willingness to negotiate resulted in a 
negotiating in-group leader being judged more effective and this in turn resulted in their 
being chosen by 90 percent of participants. When the out-group signalled it was not willing to 
negotiate, there was a dramatic reversal in this result with just over half (51%) opting for the 
oppositional leader, who was now judged to be more effective. Thus, where the out-group’s 
intransigence closed off the possibility of a negotiated solution, we observed a shift from the 
‘dove’ model of leader preference observed in Studies 1 and 2 to a ‘hawk’ model of leader 
preference. Contrary to our predictions, prototypicality did not mediate people’s shift in 
decision-making (inconsistent with H3a); it appeared that strategic concerns rather than 
representativeness dominated the decision.  
 
STUDY 4 
In the first three studies, participants were asked to respond to scenarios affecting 
groups with which there was no basis for identity and so of psychological investment, and 
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where there was minimal information about the context and the rival in-group leaders. This 
raises questions about the interpretation of our results in terms of group processes. In Study 4 
we sought to address this through recruiting participants who belonged to or could imagine 
themselves belonging to political or community activist groups and linking the scenarios with 
these groups. We retained the same hypotheses as for Study 3.  
 
Method 
Participants and design.  We recruited 408 participants via Pureprofile, an on-line 
survey company. After screening out participants who did not nominate an activist group and 
removal of two participants who failed the manipulation checks, we were left with 136 
participants (female: 71; male: 65) aged 20 to 79 (M=48). Participants were mainly British 
(n=134); with a median household income of between £30,000 and £39,000 (above the 
national median of £27,000); and political views across the left-right spectrum, with the 
median close to the center of the scale (Mdn=48 on a 100 point scale).   
Study 4 employed a between groups design comparing the effect of the independent 
variable (out-group willingness to negotiate) at two levels (negotiate; not negotiate) on the 
dependent variable, choice of in-group leader. Leader effectiveness and prototypicality were 
again investigated as potential mediators in the relationship between out-group willingness to 
negotiate and choice of leader.  
 
Materials and procedure.  
Participants were first asked to list activist groups to which they belonged or could 
imagine themselves belonging; and then to nominate one group that was particularly 
meaningful to them, and write about its values and goals. A diverse range of groups were 
nominated including political parties of all persuasions (39), environment, conservation and 
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animal welfare groups (38), social justice and identity-based groups (21), trade unions (17), 
and an assortment of church and local community groups (20).  
Participants were next asked to describe a scenario where a powerful out-group had 
announced a decision that was particularly harmful to their group, such as loss of political or 
legal status, loss of funding, or support for an opposing group’s interests. Responses varied in 
detail from merely re-stating one of the examples given (e.g., loss of funding) to elaborating 
on the kind of threat their organization might experience and the implications.  
Leader manipulation: Participants were presented in a randomized order with 
information about two leader candidates, who were both described in terms suggesting they 
were plausible, experienced candidates. For the ease of the reader we will refer to these 
leaders as Leader N (negotiate) and Leader O (opposition). Participants read:  
Imagine there are two people who have worked hard for your group over the years 
and have at various times taken on positions of leadership. They each have different 
strengths and ways of doing things; and in the current crisis they are proposing very 
different strategies. This has created a division in your group and a meeting has been 
called to choose between these two potential leaders.  
Leader N is a good lobbyist and has been successful in securing the support of 
others to your group’s cause. Leader N believes that through careful negotiation with 
this powerful group, a satisfactory resolution can be achieved. 
Leader O is an active campaigner and has been successful in mobilizing 
people to defeat proposals harmful to the goals of your group. Leader O believes that 
what is required is the organization of strong collective action against this powerful 
group. 
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Out-group manipulation: Participants were then told that the day of the meeting has 
arrived and members of the group have just heard news that the leader of the other group has 
publicly announced either: “whilst it is unlikely that they will change their decision, they are 
prepared to discuss their decision with your group and to negotiate” (willingness to 
negotiate); or “their decision is final and they are not prepared to negotiate or even discuss 
their decision with your group” (unwillingness to negotiate: See Appendix D for scenarios 
and manipulations). 
Manipulation checks. The manipulations of leader tactic and out-group willingness to 
negotiate were each followed immediately with a manipulation check. Participants were 
asked which leader had the tactic of negotiation and whether the out-group was prepared to 
negotiate. Where participants gave the incorrect answer they were presented with the correct 
information and asked to answer again. Only those who answered correctly were able to 
continue.  
The same items as in Study 3 were used to measure leader choice, effectiveness 
(α=.73), and prototypicality (α=.81). Once again, higher scores indicated choice of leader N 
and that leader N was seen as more effective and prototypical than leader O. The inter-
correlation between the effectiveness and prototypicality composite scales was r = .34, 
p<.001).   
 
Results 
A chi-square test of independence found that support for Leader N (negotiate) was 
significantly stronger in the condition where the out-group signaled willingness to negotiate 
(72%) compared to the un-willingness to negotiate condition (46%), 2(1, N=136) = 9.29, 
p=.002. One sample T-tests compared the overall means for relative effectiveness (M=4.18, 
SD=1.31) and prototypicality (M=4.09, SD=1.34) ratings of Leader N vs Leader O against the 
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mid-point of the scales. Consistent with the previous studies, there was an overall perception 
that Leader N (negotiate) was more effective and prototypical than Leader O (opposition: 
ts=37.11, 35.14, ps < .001). The overall means, standard deviations and inter-correlations are 
shown in Table 4.  
 
Insert Table 4 here 
 
In order to examine the indirect effects of out-group preparedness to negotiate on the 
choice of Leader N via effectiveness and prototypicality, mediation analyses were conducted 
using Hayes’ (2013) PROCESS computational model. Out-group negotiate (coded +1, out-
group willing to negotiate, or -1, not willing to negotiate) was entered as the predictor, and 
leader choice as the criterion. Perceived leader effectiveness and prototypicality were 
analyzed as simultaneous mediators of the effect of out-group negotiate on leader choice. 
Bootstrapping with 5000 samples and 95% confidence intervals was used to assess the 
significance of the indirect effects.  
As Figure 4 illustrates, the total effect of out-group preparedness to negotiate on the 
choice of Leader N was significant. In line with H3, most participants supported Leader N 
(negotiate) in the condition where the out-group was prepared to negotiate (73%); most 
however supported Leader O (opposition) where the out-group was not prepared to negotiate 
(54%). This effect remained significant but decreased when the mediators were included in 
the model.  
 
Insert Figure 4 here 
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Analysis of effectiveness and prototypicality as parallel mediators revealed that once 
again, effectiveness but not prototypicality was associated with the out-group’s preparedness 
to negotiate. When the out-group was prepared to negotiate, the negotiating leader candidate 
(Leader N) was rated as relatively more effective (M=4.58, SD=1.31), but not more 
prototypical (M=4.04, SD=1.42) than when the out-group was not prepared to negotiate 
(Ms=3.73, 4.16; SDs=1.18, 1.26 and ts=-3.94, .051, ps < .001, .616). Both effectiveness and 
prototypicality were associated with leader choice: those who chose Leader N perceived this 
leader to be more effective than those who chose Leader O (Ms=4.87, 3.19; SDs=.97, 1.20; 
t=-9.30, p<.001), and more prototypical than those who chose Leader O (Ms=4.87, 3.48; 
SDs=.97, 1.31; t=-4.72, p<.001).  
Consistent with the above, inspection of the bias corrected confidence intervals 
revealed significant indirect effects of out-group preference on leader choice via effectiveness 
(IE = .76, SE = .30, 95% CI .31, 1.43), but not prototypicality (IE = -.04 SE = .09, 95% CI -
.25, .13).  
Discussion 
Once again, the out-group’s willingness to negotiate did affect leader support as 
predicted (H3 supported). Indeed, in this study conducted with activist group members or 
sympathizers, and involving more meaningful scenarios, the pattern of results closely 
mirrored those observed in Study 3 (73% support for the negotiator where the out-group was 
prepared to negotiate; and 54% support for the oppositional candidate where they were not). 
Once again, this shift was related to people’s perceptions of who in this context would be the 
more effective leader and whilst prototypicality predicted leader choice, it was not found to 
play a mediating role (H3a partially supported). Thus, participants were responding to the 
differing contexts in a strategic manner where what was affected by the manipulation was 
beliefs about the leader’s ability to deliver for the group.  
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General Discussion 
This research extends research on collective action, negotiation, and leadership by 
addressing the role of out-groups in the intra-group struggles over leadership that may occur 
in contexts of intergroup conflict. Whereas collective action research has focussed on how 
intergroup conflict enhances support for oppositional forms of collective action, this research 
proceeds from the notion that within groups there may be competition between potential 
leaders with each presenting their own vision of what forms of collective action are needed to 
advance the groups interests. Included in these, is the possibility of negotiation with an out-
group.  
In the present data we found that in a context of intergroup threat, a leader who 
advocated a within-system, negotiating tactic, was preferred over one who advocated the 
mobilization of opposition (Study 1). This is consistent with research showing that within-
system forms of action are normative where the intergroup relationship is unstable and there 
appears to be some potential for resolution or a change in the relationship (Tausch & Becker, 
2012; Tausch et al., 2011; Wright, 2001). Studies 2, 3 and 4 provided novel findings in 
demonstrating that through signalling their intentions towards the in-group, out-groups can 
have a bearing on in-group processes of leader selection. In Study 2, an out-group’s 
expression of preference for a particular leader appeared to bolster support for that leader. In 
Studies 3 and 4 group members chose a negotiating leader only where the out-group was 
prepared to negotiate; but where the out-group was not prepared to negotiate, support for the 
negotiating leader was compromised and instead participants opted for an oppositional leader. 
Similar patterns were noted in Study 4 as in Study 3, replicating the previous findings in a 
different cultural context, and in the subset of respondents who were involved or interested in 
politics and thinking of specific activist groups. 
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The potential for out-groups to affect internal influence processes is recognized in 
research on intergroup negotiation (Teixeira et al., 2011) and reconciliation (Bar Tal, 2000; 
Nadler & Leviatan, 2006), and informs understandings of effective counter-insurgency 
strategy (Callaway & Harrelson-Stephens, 2006). In the context of concerns about 
radicalisation and when people will heed oppositional voices of leadership, the understanding 
that the actions of powerful outgroups (such as governments) are key to these dynamics, is an 
important message (Blackwood, Hopkins, & Reicher, 2013, 2015). To date, however, the role 
of intergroup signalling has not received as much attention in the wider social-psychological 
collective action or leadership research; mainly this research focuses on perceptions of the 
intergroup relationship (e.g., stability; Wright, 2001), but rarely on the specifics of what out-
groups do to shape those perceptions.  
Whilst our main focus was on the role of out-groups in moderating in-group leader 
choice, we also tested the mediating effects of perceived leader effectiveness and leader 
prototypicality. Consistent with the central role afforded instrumental motives in dual-process 
models of collective action (Tausch et al., 2011; Thomas et al., 2014; van Zomeren, Leach, & 
Spears, 2012), and in the wider literature on political leadership (Chemers, 2001) and 
negotiation (de Dreu, Aaldering, & Saygi, 2015), across all four studies, the perception of 
who would be the most effective leader in achieving the group’s goals mediated people’s 
leader choice. However, whilst leader protoypicality mediated the relationship between leader 
tactic and leader choice in Study 1, it did not mediate people’s decision-making in the other 
three studies (2, 3 and 4) where the intentions of the out-group were in play. That is to say, in 
the studies where people were presented with out-group signals about willingness to 
negotiate, people’s decision making appeared to reflect concerns about the leader’s ability to 
deliver for the group, but not the leader’s representativeness of the group.  
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This is consistent with Texeira and colleagues’ (2011; see also Morton et al., 2007) 
argument that instrumental goals may take precedence over identity concerns when there is a 
likelihood of success. Given the inter-correlations between leader effectiveness and 
prototypicality in our data, and the theoretically complex relations between these constructs, 
we do not wish to over-play the importance of our findings. Based on the leadership research 
informed by the social identity perspective we would expect out-group signals affecting 
beliefs about the intergroup relationship (e.g., legitimacy and stability) to affect leader 
prototypicality judgements (Gleibs & Haslam, 2016). Moreover, we would expect this effect 
to be both independent of effects on leader effectiveness and in interaction (Steffens et al., 
2013). Accordingly, we want to echo others’ calls for recognition of people’s strategic 
decision-making as reflected in the wider leadership literature, and the importance therefore 
of including leader effectiveness alongside leader prototypicality in research (Haslam et al., 
2011).  
 
Limitations and future research 
The use of relatively abstract and minimalist scenarios allowed for clarity and rigor in 
the experimental manipulations. The effects we observed in the first three studies are 
noteworthy because they were found in relatively abstract contexts where we would not 
expect people to be strongly identified with the group or invested in its outcomes. And we are 
encouraged by the replication of our findings in the fourth study involving those with an 
interest in activism who were able to respond to the hypothetical scenarios in the context of 
their political interests and sympathies. But, by the same token, we need to be cautious in the 
claims we can make from this research. For example, the low ratio of respondents who self-
report being interested in activism and politics in Study 4 (well under 1/3) highlights that the 
online panels used in all four studies may draw primarily on the politically disengaged or 
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disaffected, representative perhaps of the community but not of fervent activists, who may 
have different norms or values. 
Similarly, although including both British (Study 4) and American (Studies 1-3) 
respondents, the research was conducted with WEIRD (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 
2010) populations and we would not expect the normative expectations regarding negotiation 
that hold in a liberal democracy to hold everywhere. For instance, out-group signalling of 
conciliatory intentions may have a very different meaning in contexts where there is a history 
of powerful groups reneging on deals and brutally suppressing former allies. Second, there 
are inevitably demand characteristics entailed in experimental studies such as these where 
people are constrained in terms of the kind of information and the kinds of responses that are 
available to them. Third, and related to our second point, it could be argued that the minimal 
information contained in our manipulation was similar to a sequential prisoner dilemma study 
and that our findings simply reflect reciprocity motives (see Clark & Sefton, 2001). We note, 
however, that this explanation would need additional empirical justification as much research 
has shown that outgroups are not necessarily within our circle of concern and so are not 
entitled to reciprocity prima facie (Crimston, Bain, Hornsey, & Bastian, 2016). 
Most crucially, in a real world context where there is a historical and temporal aspect 
to inter-group relations, the ‘first mover’ literature (Clark & Sefton, 2001; Dufwenberg & 
Kirchsteiger, 2004) is qualified by the realisation that there is always a historical precedent. 
Group members will be engaged in argument over the construal of the context and of what 
sort of leadership is required, and the behaviour of the out-group in the past will qualify the 
in-group’s reactions in the present. Put differently, context-specific trust in the out-group will 
moderate the impact of out-group statements on in-group members’ actions, making them 
more responsive or sceptical and reactive to out-group endorsements and affirmations of 
willingness to negotiate.  Accordingly, future research needs to be conducted in particular 
Leader choice: out-group signals and collective action tactics 
real world contexts, where we can examine the complexity of the kinds of intergroup contexts 
that frame intragroup leadership contests.  
For instance, Muslim communities in the West are experiencing considerable threat 
and there is currently disagreement among British Muslims about how leaders should respond 
to government overtures to cooperate in the counter-terrorism agenda. An understanding of 
how out-groups (e.g., government, religious and other civic organisations) can bolster or 
undermine these competing voices of leadership, is one important direction for future 
research. Specific questions about differences in how negotiators, spokespeople, and leaders 
are evaluated could form part of that research agenda, along with questions about whether 
actors themselves understand support as a strategic response to a set of circumstances (e.g., 
out-group actions), or whether it is accompanied by a re-evaluation of one’s own identity and 
indeed, of what constitutes appropriate forms of collective response (Blackwood et al., 2015).  
Future research also needs to consider the processes underpinning how people make 
decisions about leaders in these contexts; for instance, what identities and identity processes 
are entailed, and the role of theoretically important constructs such as effectiveness and 
prototypicality. Whilst our research found that leader effectiveness and not leader 
prototypicality was affected by our manipulations, it is arguable that all leaders in our study 
were effectively presented as prototypical. Accordingly, one avenue for future research could 
be to consider whether an effective leader would still be supported if they were not 
prototypical. Thus, as well as considering the independent effects, future research needs to 
consider the potential interactive effects between leader effectiveness and leader 
prototypicality. Research examining dual process explanations of collective action 
(Blackwood & Louis, 2012; van Zomeren et al., 2012) may provide insights that could 
inform such a research agenda.   
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Arguably, there is a clear need to sharpen our understanding of collective action 
leadership through closer attention to the specific situational cues out-groups provide through 
their actions; and the specific forms of response available to groups. But, more generally, it is 
our hope that collective action researchers will be inspired, if only by the limitations in our 
research, to dive into the rich vein of questions that are raised, once we begin to think of 
struggles over collective action leadership, and of negotiation as a collective action tactic.  
 
Take-home messages 
There are two-take home messages from this research. On an applied level, the first 
point we want to make with this research is that we need an understanding of leadership 
tactics in relation to the dynamic nature of intergroup conflict. Leaders must be sensitive to 
the exigencies of mobilizing an ‘us versus them’ sentiment whilst not closing the door on 
negotiation. The second related point is that we need a more nuanced understanding of the 
goals and forms that collective action may take. This has been highlighted by a number of 
commentators in recent debates about social change research (e.g., Blackwood, Livingstone, 
& Leach, 2013). For instance, Sweetman, Leach, Spears, Patto, & Saab (2013) propose that 
‘collective’ mobilization whereby group interests are advanced within the system through 
strategies such as negotiation, has hitherto received scant attention. When we consider social 
movements, a range of tactics are typically employed and may be combined in an 
overarching strategy. Moreover, there is often division within movements over tactics, and 
these divisions can be a catalyst for leadership challenges.  
In sum, intergroup conflict may present a context where group members accentuate 
intergroup differences and support for oppositional forms of leadership. But, the real world 
can provide ample examples of political contests (for instance, party pre-selection processes) 
where groups may be divided over whether what is needed is a leader who represents the 
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group’s values or one who can secure political success. Research on collective action, 
negotiation, and leadership suggest a more nuanced picture where social change beliefs (e.g., 
the possibility of change within the system) and the nature of group goals (e.g., short term vs 
long term; incremental vs substantial) play a role. The realpolitik suggests that what out-
groups do over the course of conflict should be critical to shaping these beliefs and goals. 
 
End Note 
1  The word ‘prepared’ has a number of meanings, including ‘willing to do something’ (see Merriam-
Webster dictionary). This particular meaning might be idiomatic to native English speakers. Given the 
way in which the word is used and the fact that the respondents were from the US and the UK, we are 
confident that this meaning would have been understood. 
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Appendix A 
Study 1: Scenario with manipulation of leader tactic 
We want you to think about a hypothetical situation. Please read this information carefully as 
it will be important to remember when answering questions.    
Imagine you are a member of a group. There is another group that is considering a decision 
that threatens your group’s interests.   There are two potential leaders in your group: we will 
call them Leader X and Leader Y.   
Leader tactic conditions 
Negotiate tactic condition: Leader Y thinks the best strategy to stop this threatening decision 
is to negotiate with the other group.   
Opposition tactic: Leader Y thinks the best strategy to stop this threatening decision is to 
organize opposition to the other group. 
Control condition: [no additional information provided]. 
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Appendix B 
Study 2: Scenario with manipulation of out-group endorsement of Leader A 
We want you to think about a hypothetical situation. Imagine you are a member of a group. 
There is another group that is considering a decision that would harm your group’s interests. 
There are two potential leaders in your group: we will call them Leader A and Leader B.  
Out-group signal conditions 
Outgroup endorsement: The other group has indicated that it is happy to negotiate with 
Leader A from your group.  
Outgroup non-endorsement: The other group has indicated that it would prefer not to 
negotiate with Leader A from your group.  
Control condition: [no additional information provided]. 
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Appendix C 
Study 3: Scenario with in-group leader strategies and manipulation of out-group signal 
of willingness to negotiate 
We want you to think about a hypothetical situation. Please read this information carefully as 
it will be important to remember when answering questions.  
Imagine you are a member of a group. There is another group that is considering a decision 
that threatens your group’s interests.   There are two potential leaders in your group: we will 
call them Leader N and Leader O. Both potential leaders are appealing to members of your 
group to support them.    
Leader N's strategy to stop the other group's threatening decision is to negotiate with the other 
group.   Leader O's strategy to stop the other group's threatening decision is to mobilize 
opposition to the other group.    
Out-group signal conditions 
Out-group willingness to negotiate condition: The leader of the other group has issued a 
statement saying they are prepared to negotiate.      
Out-group unwillingness to negotiate condition: The leader of the other group has issued a 
statement saying they are not prepared to negotiate.      
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Appendix D 
Study 4: Scenario with in-group leader strategies and manipulation of out-group signal 
of willingness to negotiate 
Selection of group 
Later in this study we will ask you to imagine a scenario involving a group that is involved in 
political, social, economic, or environmental activism. Please list all the groups you belong to 
(or that you could imagine yourself belonging to).    Note: if you don't want to name a group 
it is fine to give a general description (e.g., political party, trade union, social issues group, 
disability group, community action group, etc.) List as many as you can think of that matter 
to you. 
Now please select one of these groups. This will be the group you will be asked to think 
about in the remainder of the survey. Which group have you selected? 
Please tell us something about this group (e.g., its values and goals) and why it is important to 
you.  
Out-group threat 
Now imagine a scenario where a powerful group (e.g., government, non-government 
organisation, industry) has announced a decision that will have serious negative 
consequences for your group. Try to think of something that would be particularly harmful 
to your group and its goals (e.g., loss of funding; loss of political or legal status; support for 
an opposing group's interests).    Below, we want you to describe the scenario you have 
imagined in as much detail as you can. 
Out-group signal of willingness to negotiate 
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We want you to think about a hypothetical situation. Please read this information carefully as 
it will be important when answering the questions that follow.   
Imagine there are two people (Jamie and Pat) who have worked hard for your group over the 
years and have at various times taken on positions of leadership. They each have different 
strengths and ways of doing things; and in the current crisis they are proposing very different 
strategies. This has created a division in your group and a meeting has been called to choose 
between these two potential leaders. Jamie is a good lobbyist and has been successful in 
securing the support of others to your group’s cause. Jamie believes that through careful 
negotiation with this powerful group, a satisfactory resolution can be achieved.   Pat is an 
active campaigner and has been successful in mobilizing people to defeat proposals harmful 
to the goals of your group. Pat believes that what is required is the organization of strong 
collective action against this powerful group.    
Out-group signal conditions 
Out-group willingness to negotiate: Finally, the day of the meeting has arrived. You and other 
members of your group have just heard news that the leader of the other group has publicly 
stated that, whilst it is unlikely that they will change their decision, they are prepared to 
discuss their decision with your group and to negotiate.  
Out-group unwillingness to negotiate: Finally, the day of the meeting has arrived. You and 
other members of your group have just heard news that the leader of the other group has 
publicly stated that their decision is final and they are not prepared to negotiate or even 
discuss their decision with your group. 
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